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Abstract 
Within international relations one seldom finds discussion of how 
legitimacy affects ‘state capacity’—a state’s capacity to enact and adapt to 
domestic and international change. This is especially surprising for neo-
Weberian approaches that have viewed state capacity as a major concern 
for over two decades. And although legitimacy was a key ingredient to 
Max Weber’s approach to the state, the concept is eschewed or ignored in 
the three discernible neo-Weberian approaches to state capacity. The first 
two of these approaches, ‘isolated autonomy’ and ‘embedded autonomy’, 
produce functionalist view of a state which responds to an anarchical 
international system. The third, ‘social embeddedness’, conceives of the 
state–society complex as a contested rather than functional space but does 
not produce a substantive conception of legitimacy. I argue that a 
reinvigorated conception of legitimacy provides us with a substantive neo-
Weberian ‘historicist’ approach that provides a deeper understanding of 
how both norms and material interests shape the state. This approach is 
applied to a brief case study of financial reform in the United States and 
Japan to illustrate that bringing legitimacy back in provides a better means 
of understanding state capacity. 
Keywords: state capacity, legitimacy, neo-Weberian, historicist, state 
theory, embedded autonomy, consent, acquiescence, financial reform, 
Japan, United States. 
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state theory and international relations 
LEONARD SEABROOKE1 
This paper provides a sympathetic critique of neo-Weberian works on 
‘state capacity’ and advances a revised ‘neo-Weberian historicist 
approach’ through a reinvigorated emphasis on legitimacy. Why then is 
there a need to reintroduce legitimacy into conceptualising state capacity? 
There are four reasons for doing so. First, within Weberian ‘state theory’, 
prominent neo-Weberians like Michael Mann and Theda Skocpol ironically 
exclude or downplay the very concept that was a hallmark of Max 
Weber’s approach to the state—legitimacy.2 Second, and most 
importantly, by ‘bringing legitimacy back in’ we can produce a more 
refined approach to the state: one that emphasises ‘contestation’ between 
the state and society. By contestation, I am referring to the point that 
society has an input into the formation of state policy. In the process, my 
prime objective here is to reintroduce a bottom-up approach to the state–
society complex and to understanding state capacity. This, I believe, has 
been one of the principal lacunae within Weberian state theory, which has 
been excessively concerned with a top-down approach. Indeed this has, 
rightly in my view, been one of the principal critiques of the approach in 
 
1  Departmental Visitor, Department of International Relations, Research School of Pacific and Asian 
Studies, Australian National University. My thanks to those who provided comments on earlier 
drafts, particularly Mlada Bukovansky, Richard DeAngelis, Sophie Hague, John Hobson, Ian Marsh 
and David Scott Mathieson. 
2  David Beetham, Max Weber and the theory of modern politics (Cambridge: Polity, 1985), p. 253; 
Theda Skocpol, States and social revolutions: A comparative analysis of France, Russia, and China 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 31; Michael Mann, The sources of social power, 
Vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986) and compared to Michael Mann, The sources 
of social power, Vol. II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). As argued by John Hobson, 
there is a clear difference in the approach to power between the first and second volumes of Mann’s 
masterwork. I place the second volume within the third approach to state capacity discussed below. 
See John Hobson, The state and international relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000), chapter 6.  
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general.3 A top-down approach inevitably leads to a functionalist 
explanation.  
Functionalist explanations measure state capacity only in terms of 
economic outcomes (that is, economic success implies high state 
capacity). Moreover, functionalism views society as an instrument to the 
enhancement of state capacity, which in turn means that it becomes 
impossible to conceptualise the state–society relationship as fully 
reciprocal. In other words, states use society to gratify or enhance their 
capacity. There is no notion that society can autonomously prescribe the 
parameters within which state policies are formulated, nor can society 
contest the policies that states autonomously formulate. Moreover, 
moving away from functionalism realigns us with Weber’s preference that 
‘[s]ociologically, the state cannot be defined in terms of its ends’ and 
brings to the fore issues of how we understand society within the state; 
chiefly whether people are understood as acquiescent to the state’s 
functional needs, or whether their consent is required to legitimate state 
actions.4 Thus my central claim is that we need to bring society back in if 
we are to produce an adequate theory of state capacity within a neo-
Weberian framework. And in turn we can best achieve this by bringing 
social legitimacy back in.  
Third, functionalist explanations are necessarily weak in explaining or 
even conceptualising change. Thus for example, Skocpol’s discussion of 
social revolutions is arguably ahistorical. A social revolution will happen 
regardless of time and place, so long as the state is defeated in war (which 
in turn is a function of the state’s weak capacity). Thus I seek to develop a 
neo-Weberian historicist approach, which is made possible by focusing on 
social norms. And because social norms change over time, so the social 
sources of state capacity will necessarily change over time. I argue that an 
historicist approach which avoids the application of an evolutionary or 
 
3  Bob Jessop, State theory: Putting the capitalist state in its place (Cambridge: Polity, 1990), 
pp. 278–88; and Paul Cammack ‘Bringing the state back in: A polemic?’, British Journal of 
Political Science 19(3) 1989, pp. 261–90. 
4  Max Weber, ‘Politics as a vocation’, in Hans H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds, From Max Weber: 
Essays in sociology, translated by Hans H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1948), p. 77. See also Max Weber, Political writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1994), p. 24. 
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ahistorical logic provides a better understanding of domestic and inter-
national change.5 
Fourth, and following on from the previous point is that my approach 
offers a way beyond the neorealist aspect of neo-Weberian state theory. 
Most versions, though not all, implicitly or explicitly invoke neorealism, 
in the sense that states are situated within an anarchic state system.6 The 
crucial point is that responding to anarchy displaces the need for states to 
respond to social needs emanating from within society.  
To summarise, there are four reasons for bringing legitimacy back in:  
• Legitimacy is the hallmark of Max Weber’s approach to the state–
society complex but is ignored in neo-Weberian scholarship. 
• Legitimacy permits the view of the state–society complex as a 
contested rather than functional space, which requires an apprecia-
tion of both social norms and material factors in their historical 
context. 
• Legitimacy assists the development of a historicist approach 
which does not apply an ahistorical or evolutionary logic to 
change. 
• Legitimacy allows us to view state action as more than a func-
tional response to constraints imposed by an international 
anarchical system. 
Realising these objectives will be done by augmenting the social 
embeddedness into a ‘neo-Weberian historicist approach’ which has a 
substantive conception of legitimacy in the state–society complex.7  
 
5  In particular see Reinhard Bendix, Force, fate and freedom: On historical sociology (London: 
University of California Press, 1984). 
6  Hobson, The state and international relations, chapter 6.  
7  I refer to an approach rather than theory because different research questions require different 
methodological tools and there is no overarching general theory. Thus, rather than a theory, I outline 
an approach, consistent with methodology of Max Weber and neo-Weberian historicists, which 
emphasises studying material conditions and norms involved in the legitimation of a constellation of 
power within a historically specific period.  
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Some readers may be surprised that there are three discernible neo-
Weberian approaches to state capacity, since the neo-Weberian approach 
is commonly equated by international relations (IR) audiences with early 
formulations advocated by Skocpol.8 In analysing the ‘isolated autonomy’, 
‘embedded autonomy’, and ‘social embeddedness’ approaches I analyse 
their views of the domestic arena, the international arena, and how the 
approach handles the concept of legitimacy. Part one of this paper 
analyses the isolated autonomy approach—commonly equated with the 
‘bringing the state back in’ school. This approach was of course most 
famously advocated by Skocpol, who in turn explicitly eschews analysis 
of a state’s legitimacy.9 Moreover, it equates state autonomy with a 
situation in which the state must ‘isolate’ itself from domestic forces in 
order to push through its policies. Part two discusses the embedded 
autonomy approach. I argue that it goes beyond the first position by 
insisting that states enhance their effectiveness to pursue goals (for 
example, economic development) by becoming embedded in society 
while retaining a formal degree of ‘institutional autonomy’.10 However, 
while embedded autonomy does not explicitly address the issue of 
legitimacy, it is implicit that states can only enhance their interests when 
conferred legitimacy from dominant economic groupings (the capitalist 
class). Even so, both isolated autonomy and embedded autonomy retain a 
functionalist approach to state capacity. The approaches are very much 
top-down and society is viewed as fundamentally acquiescent to the 
state’s functional needs.  
Part three analyses the social embeddedness approach, in which it is 
argued that states can enhance their interests only when they become 
deeply embedded within the whole of society. In this approach state–
society relations are viewed as contested rather than merely functional and 
the approach raises questions of state legitimacy and autonomy. In doing 
 
  8  Skocpol, States and social revolutions. 
  9  Skocpol, States and social revolutions, pp. 31–2. 
10  As developed in Peter Evans, Embedded autonomy: States and industrial transformation (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1995); Linda Weiss and John M. Hobson, States and economic 
development: A comparative historical analysis (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995); and Linda Weiss, 
The myth of the powerless state: Governing the economy in a global era (Oxford: Polity Press, 
1998). 
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so, it also raises the question of whether we should view people in society 
as ‘acquiescent’ or whether their ‘active consent’ is required to legitimate 
state actions. While this approach is full of promise, it uses the concept of 
social embeddedness as an inadequate proxy for legitimacy and needs to 
be conceptually advanced. The last two sections of the paper seek to 
conceptually advance the social embeddedness approach and transform it 
into a ‘neo-Weberian historicist approach’. Part four provides a reinvi-
gorated conception of legitimacy which stresses the importance of consent 
and social norms, while part five applies this to a brief case study of 
financial reform in the United States and Japan.  
ISOLATED STATE AUTONOMY 
Obviously the approaches discussed here derive their view of the state 
from Max Weber.11 The primary impetus for this scholarship has been that 
rather than viewing the state as a passive receptor of social wants or as 
determined by the interests of the dominant class, the state has institu-
tional differentiation and autonomy from society. Indeed, reasserting state 
autonomy in contrast to liberal and Marxist theories within political 
science and sociology was the starting point for writers in the isolated 
autonomy approach, and an ongoing concern for neo-Weberians in the 
other approaches discussed here. During the 1960s and 1970s a range of 
‘societal’ approaches in political science, particularly Marxism, liberalism 
and pluralism, challenged the ‘state’ as a conceptual variable. In response, 
J.P. Nettl argued that concepts of ‘stateness’ are important in different-
iating societies, and provided the following cue that was later taken up by 
neo-Weberians: 
But if [the state] can be made into an operating variable that points up 
significant differences and discontinuities between societies, making 
 
11  Skocpol, States and social revolutions, p. 304, note 4; Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Peter B. Evans, 
‘The state and economic transformation: Toward an analysis of the conditions underlying effective 
intervention’, in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol, eds, Bringing the state 
back in (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 46–7; Evans, Embedded autonomy, p. 
5; and John M. Hobson, The wealth of states: A comparative sociology of international economic 
and political change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 2–3.  
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possible systematically qualitative or even quantitative distinctions, there 
may be a case for bringing it back in.12 
The isolated autonomy approach was endorsed by writers reacting to 
Marxist and liberal approaches and the perceived ‘creeping socio-
logization’ of state theory and international relations.13 From a Weberian 
premise, these writers sought to retain the integrity of the state as an 
analytical construct and to reassert its autonomy.14 The basic tenet of the 
approach reflected this attitude; that the ‘central characteristic ... [of state 
capacity is] the ability of the state to overcome domestic resistance is its 
strength in relation to its own society’.15 Undoubtedly the most important 
work in answering Nettl’s appeal for ‘bringing the state back in’ was 
Skocpol’s 1979 book, States and social revolutions. Skocpol linked ‘state 
autonomy’ with a state’s capacity to conduct and formulate policy free of 
societal constraint, differentiating her conception of state autonomy from 
the neo-Marxist literature and its concern for the state’s ‘relative 
autonomy’.16 
Skocpol argued that liberal and Marxist approaches diverge over 
whether the state is an arena of action embodying ‘fundamentally 
consensually based legitimate authority, or fundamental coercive 
 
12  J.P. Nettl, ‘The state as a conceptual variable’, World Politics 20(4) 1968, pp. 559–92, at p. 562. 
13  Richard Leaver, ‘International political economy and the changing world order: Evolution or 
involution’, in Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey R.D. Underhill, eds, Political economy and the 
changing global order (London: Macmillan, 1994), p. 132.  
14  Robert Gilpin, The political economy of international relations (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1987), p. 11, note 2; Stephen D. Krasner, ‘State power and the structure of international trade’, 
World Politics 28(3) 1976, pp. 317–47, at p. 317; Stephen D. Krasner, Structural conflict: The Third 
World against global liberalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 17; and Alfred 
Stepan, The state and society: Peru in comparative perspective (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1978), pp. 3–46. 
15  Lewis W. Snider, ‘Identifying the elements of state power: Where do we begin?’, Comparative 
Political Studies 20(3) 1987, pp. 314–56, at p. 319; Stephen D. Krasner, Defending the national 
interest: Raw materials investments and US foreign policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1978), p. 55; and Bruno Trezzini, ‘Embedded state autonomy and legitimacy: Piecing together the 
Malaysian development puzzle’, Economy and Society 30(3) 2001, pp. 324–53, at p. 334. 
16  Nicos Poulantzas, Political power and social classes (London: New Left Books, 1973); Ralph 
Miliband, Class power and state power (London: Verso, 1983); Fred Block, ‘The ruling class does 
not rule; Notes on the Marxist theory of the state’, Socialist Revolution 7, 1977, pp. 6–28; and 
Jessop, State theory. 
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domination’.17 In contrast, for Skocpol the state is more than an arena. 
Rather, it is a ‘set of administrative, policing, and military organizations 
headed, and more or less well coordinated by, an executive authority’.18 A 
loss of legitimacy does not necessarily lead to a loss of organisational 
capacities and therefore the heuristic value of studying processes of 
legitimation is limited.19  
To stress her view that the state should be taken seriously as a macro-
structure and to differentiate it from liberal and Marxist approaches, 
Skocpol ‘brings the state back in’ by ‘kicking society out’.20 Not 
surprisingly, she is extremely hostile to the notion that states have (or fail 
to have) legitimacy. Indeed, she adamantly insists that it is important to 
dispel a focus on state legitimacy when trying to explain the causes of 
social revolution, and advocates a focus on ‘structural’ factors.21 The 
approach is therefore very much top-down, wherein society provides a 
functional contribution determined by the state’s organisational capacity. 
This leads Skocpol to focus only on the institutional aspects of state 
autonomy found in Weber, leading her to a ‘mistaken assumption that the 
state apparatus is entirely self-contained, and can be immunised from the 
attitudes and actions of the surrounding population’.22 Unlike Weber’s 
work, Skocpol and other scholars in the isolated autonomy approach do 
not emphasise the state embedding itself in society. 
This, I believe, is a serious betrayal of Max Weber, made all the more 
grievous by the fact that Skocpol’s work has been widely received as the 
neo-Weberian approach to the state. This betrayal can clearly be identified 
 
17  Skocpol, States and social revolutions, p. 25. 
18  Skocpol, States and social revolutions, p. 29. Compare Michael Mann, States, war and capitalism: 
Studies in political sociology (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), p. 3, where Mann argues that the state 
is merely an arena, which is more in line with Weber’s thoughts on the state–society complex. See 
Max Weber, ‘The meaning of ethical neutrality’, in E.A. Shils and H.A. Finch, eds, Sociology and 
economics in the methodology of the social sciences (Illinois: Free Press, 1949), p. 47. 
19  Skocpol, States and social revolutions, pp. 31–2. 
20  Hobson, The state and international relations, pp. 175–6. 
21  Skocpol, States and social revolutions, pp. 14–18. 
22  David Beetham, The legitimation of power (London: Macmillan, 1991), p. 118. 
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in her view that ‘insofar as Weber was willing to theorize about societal 
sociopolitical structures as whole, he tended to use categories that referred 
to political forms alone, in isolation from socioeconomic structures’.23 As 
suggested by Gordon C. Wells and Peter Baehr, this ‘at best, represents a 
very partial and particular reading of Economy and Society’.24 A wider 
reading of Weber’s work demonstrates his study of the state’s need to be 
broadly embedded in socioeconomic structures to attain legitimacy, rather 
than the mechanics of modern bureaucracy or naked power politics.25 In 
his work on Russia, in particular, Weber demonstrated that liberalism 
failed in that society due to a lack of social and institutional support for its 
ideas. His analysis of the implosion of Tsarist Russia included 
organisations and norms which contributed to the lack of legitimacy, 
which crippled the Russian state–society complex.26 But Skocpol’s 
analysis of Tsarist Russia dismisses the relevance of legitimacy and her 
approach argues that ‘consensual and voluntaristic conceptions of societal 
order and disruption are quite naïve’.27 Although Skocpol discusses the 
formation of solidarities within agrarian communities that push for 
revolution, the fundamental view of society is that people are acquiescent, 
including all the implications of the abandonment of rights associated 
with acquiescence.28 The focus shifts to how the Russian state was able 
(or not as the case may be) to organise in response to geopolitical 
pressures. 
The importance of geopolitics to Skocpol’s work cannot be overstated. 
She describes the state as Janus-faced—that the state must have sufficient 
domestic autonomy to implement change to maintain its autonomy from 
aggressors in the anarchical international system. For Skocpol, like 
Charles Tilly, inadequate centralisation as a result of insufficient state 
 
23  Skocpol, States and social revolutions, p. 304, note 4, emphasis added. 
24  From their introduction in Max Weber, The Russian revolutions (Cambridge: Polity, 1995), p. 22. 
25  John M. Hobson and Leonard Seabrooke, ‘Reimagining Weber: Constructing international society and 
the social balance of power’, European Journal of International Relations 7(2) 2001, pp. 239–74.  
26  Weber, The Russian revolutions. Compare Leonard Seabrooke, US power in international finance 
(London: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 38–43. 
27  Skocpol, States and social revolutions, p. 298, note 41. 
28  Skocpol, States and social revolutions, chapter 3. 
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autonomy cripples a state’s capacity to compete internationally.29 Her 
conclusion is that states that have successfully rationalised and centralised 
are ‘more potent within society and more powerful and autonomous over 
and against competitors within the international states system’.30 As 
Skocpol acknowledges, her view of the international system is ‘realist’. 
And like neorealist writers, and despite her argument about the Janus-
faced state, Skocpol ultimately ‘black boxes’ the state because only the 
centralisation of power against societal constraint is of concern.31 The 
state is effectively a faceless rational actor within an anarchic international 
system where military might determines winners and losers.32 On this 
same point, Skocpol claims that the international economy is as important 
as an inter-state system, although in her work it is only important to the 
degree that it supports military capacity.33 It is the anarchic international 
system that determines state behaviour, not a state’s relationship with its 
society, leading Skocpol to unwittingly ‘kick the state back out’.34 
Unsurprisingly, some international relations scholars have not unreason-
ably seen the isolated autonomy approach to understanding state capacity 
as ‘reheated neorealism’.  
It is not surprising that the functionalism of the isolated autonomy 
approach found favour with writers studying developing states facing 
geopolitical and international economic constraints. Indeed, strong elements 
of the approach to state autonomy are reflected in writers discussing 
successful strategies for highly autonomous developmental states to guide 
industrialisation and investment.35 However, it is also within the context of 
 
29  Charles Tilly, Coercion, capital and European states, AD 990–1990 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1990), pp. 137–51, 160, 186. 
30  Skocpol, States and social revolutions, pp. 161–2. 
31  Skocpol, States and social revolutions, pp. 31–2. 
32  Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of international politics (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979). 
33  Compare with Tilly, Coercion, capital and European states, pp. 83–4. 
34  Hobson, The state and international relations, pp. 180–4. For an excellent critique of Skocpol’s 
work, see Stephen Hobden, International relations and historical sociology: Breaking down 
boundaries (London: Routledge, 1998). 
35  Alice H. Amsden, Asia’s next giant: South Korea and late industrialization (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1989); Robert Wade, Governing the market: Economic theory and the role of 
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this literature that we find a shift during the 1990s to a different conception 
of state capacity (and therein state autonomy and embeddedness).  
In contrast to the notion that state autonomy implies an ability to 
override societal interests, the embedded autonomy approach argued that 
while autonomous from society, ideally the state should be embedded in 
society; that is, institutional autonomy should be anchored within the 
dominant social networks of civil society. This was in large part a reaction 
or response to the various critics of the isolated autonomy approach—
denounced as so much ‘statism’, which had merely replaced Marxist 
economic reductionism with an equally lop-sided ‘Weberian’ political 
reductionism.36 Peter Gourevitch, for example, argued that by focusing on 
organisational structure that is isolated from society, so the state capacity 
literature removed ‘politics’ from the analysis. Indeed, he asserted that 
understanding how policies were socially legitimated was by far the 
weakest aspect of state-centred arguments.37 While the concept of 
legitimacy was not seriously addressed, many neo-Weberian scholars 
responded to criticism by working on developing embeddedness as a 
conceptual variable. This was clearly an advance from the isolated 
position and took a step closer to an integrated understanding of the state–
society complex. 
EMBEDDED AUTONOMY 
While the concept of embeddedness can be traced to followers of Karl 
Polanyi’s work and a number of economic anthropologists, its popular 
incarnation has also come from neo-Weberian scholars.38 Most important 
 
government in East Asian industrialization (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990). As a 
matter of interest compare Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese miracle: The growth of 
industrial policy, 1925–1975 (Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Co., 1982) with his earlier work 
Revolutionary change (Boston: Little Brown, 1966), which Skocpol criticises for its focus on social 
legitimacy. See Skocpol, States and social revolutions, pp. 9, 11–12. 
36  Jessop, State theory, pp. 275–83. 
37  Peter Gourevitch, ‘The second image reversed: The international sources of domestic politics’, 
International Organization 32(4) 1978, pp. 881–911, at pp. 901–3, 907. 
38  Karl Polanyi, The great transformation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1944), and, more recently, Michael 
S. Billig, ‘Institutions and culture: Neo-Weberian economic anthropology’, Journal of Economic 
Issues 34(4) 2000, pp. 771–88. The application of Michael Mann’s discussion of authoritative, 
diffused, intensive, extensive, and infrastructural types of state activity has been particularly 
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among these is Peter Evans’ work on embedded autonomy. Evans 
suggests that embedded autonomy is: 
… precisely the mirror image of the incoherent despotism of the predatory 
state, [it] is the key to the developmental state’s effectiveness. ‘Embedded 
autonomy’ combines the Weberian bureaucratic insulation with intense 
connection to the surrounding social structure … Given a sufficiently 
coherent, cohesive state apparatus, isolation is not necessary to preserve 
state capacity. Connectedness means increased competence instead of 
capture.39 
Thus the embedded autonomy approach reflects a focus upon a state being 
institutionally autonomous but simultaneously embedded in dominant 
organised economic groups. State capacity is then the ability to adapt to 
change through the coordination of domestic linkages, particularly 
through harnessing domestic private capital to support the government’s 
economic policy.40 In this way, the second approach couples embed-
dedness with Mann’s concept of infrastructural power—‘the capacity of 
the state to actually penetrate civil society’—but with a functionalist 
condition in which state capacity reflects an ability ‘to penetrate and 
extract resources from society and allocate them to desired ends’.41 For 
this reason these scholars focus on states where there is ‘an “elective 
affinity” of autonomy and embeddedness’ which assists successfully 
economic development, particularly industrialisation.42  
Thus the second approach advocates a situation in which a state has 
‘implied dense links not with society but specifically with industrial 
capital’ (although Evans does argue that ideally there are implications for 
 
important in the development of embeddedness as a concept in neo-Weberian work. See Mann, The 
sources of social power, Vol. I and Vol. II. 
39  Evans, Embedded autonomy, p. 50. 
40  Weiss, The myth of the powerless state, p. 34. Compare Richard F. Doner, ‘Limits of state strength: 
Toward an institutionalist view of economic development’, World Politics 44(3) 1992, pp. 398–431.  
41  Mann, States, war and capitalism, p. 5; and Weiss and Hobson, States and economic development, 
p. 4. 
42  Ming-Chang Tsai, ‘State power, state embeddedness, and national development in less developed 
countries: A cross-national analysis’, Studies in Comparative International Development 33(4) 1999, 
pp. 66–88, at p. 67. 
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broader society).43 Economic bureaucracies must attract private entre-
preneurs so they are ‘willing to bet their capital in ways that will make 
expected policy outcomes a reality’.44 At the same time, only an autono-
mous state can prevent the emergence of cartel-like or rent-seeking 
behaviour if the state is ‘over-embedded’ in the dominant economic 
class.45 Given these difficulties in maintaining equilibrium between over 
and under-embeddedness, Evans puts forward a ‘grave-digger’ thesis; that 
in the end states with embedded autonomy will be subordinate to the 
interests of private capital.46 
It is at this point that a difference within the embedded autonomy 
literature opens up. Linda Weiss, for example, criticises Evans’ approach 
on the basis that:  
On the one hand, there is a clear sense in which it is being contrasted with 
statism (i.e. top down, insulated, non-connected decision-making). On the 
other hand, ‘embeddedness’ appears to be ‘negotiation’-neutral. For the 
thrust of Evans’ account suggests that when a state has embedded 
autonomy it can use business networks with relative ease to implement its 
own policies.47 
Unlike Evans, Weiss does not agree with the ‘grave-digger’ thesis. 
Rather, Weiss focuses upon links between state embeddedness in social 
groups, which can be re-negotiated to avoid grave-digging.48 Instead of 
embedded autonomy, Weiss terms the reciprocal yet governed relationship 
between the state and the private sector ‘governed interdependence’, 
which enables a ‘robust organizational infrastructure [that] has been 
nurtured by state policies’.49 However, the key point here—and one which 
produces a clear common ground between Weiss and Evans—is the 
 
43  Evans, Embedded autonomy, p. 17. 
44  Peter Evans, ‘Transferable lessons? Re-examining the institutional prerequisites of East Asian 
economic policies’, Journal of Development Studies 34(6) 1998, pp. 66–86, at p. 68. 
45  Evans, Embedded autonomy, p. 57. 
46  Evans, ‘Transferable lessons?’, p. 82. 
47  Weiss, The myth of the powerless state, p. 36. 
48  Weiss, The myth of the powerless state, p. 19 
49  Weiss, The myth of the powerless state, pp. 37–9. 
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notion that embeddedness must occur between the state and the dominant 
economic class, specifically, the capitalist class.50 
Though it is sometimes claimed that this view of embedded autonomy 
manages to ‘bring state–society relations back in’, this is nonetheless a 
highly problematic claim for two basic reasons. First, it is unequivocal 
that for Evans that ‘[e]mbeddedness implies a concrete set of connections 
that link the state intimately and aggressively to particular social groups 
with whom the state shares a joint project of transformation’.51 In other 
words, for the state to produce effective economic outcomes, it must be 
embedded within the dominant economic class, not necessarily the wider 
social groups within society. The same is true for Weiss. Second, gearing 
the state towards economic growth undoubtedly comes first over the 
social legitimation of the state–society complex which permits its sus-
tainable reproduction. Thus while embedded autonomy is an advance on 
isolated state autonomy, it is a functionalist approach that emphasises 
maximising state efficiency through the integration and guidance of 
private entrepreneurs in order to compete in the international system. In 
this way, dominant economic groupings are functional to the gearing of 
successful state economic policy. 
As stated above, the isolated autonomy approach has been viewed as a 
‘reheated’ form of neorealism. Like its predecessor, the embedded auton-
omy approach has no serious qualms with the neorealist conception of the 
international system. In all cases, the international is viewed as a system, 
which is defined by constant inter-state competition. Moreover, Evans 
draws from Gilpin’s view of the state as, ‘first and foremost a war-making 
machine that is the product of group survival in the condition of inter-
national anarchy’.52 The international arena imposes itself on the 
domestic, to force the domestic arena to provide a competitive response. 
And it is the same for Weiss, who understands a state’s ‘transformative 
 
50  Weiss and Hobson, The state and international relations, p. 54. Compare Evans, Embedded 
autonomy, p. 248. 
51  Evans, Embedded autonomy, p. 59, emphasis added. 
52  Evans, Embedded autonomy, p. 5; and Robert Gilpin, War and change in world politics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981). 
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capacity’ as, ‘a state’s ability to adapt to external shocks and pressures by 
generating ever-new means of governing the process of industrial 
change’.53 
Like the isolated autonomy approach, the embedded autonomy 
approach argues that states which are successfully centralised and 
embedded are able to survive or adapt under international anarchy. This is 
most effectively done through the centralisation of institutions and embed-
dedness in organised economic groups. In contrast, the decentralisation of 
decision making produces ‘antinomies of civil society that tend to 
reproduce themselves within the state, undermining the state’s capacity 
for coherent corporate action’.54 Accordingly, the embedded autonomy 
approach has difficulties in analysing states where state institutions and, in 
particular, pilot economic agencies do not play dominant roles, or where 
centralisation may in fact be harmful for embeddedness.55  
Weiss, for example, argues that the provision of pilot economic agen-
cies is a key resource. When it is lacking, as in the example of the United 
States, so international (hegemonic) power ‘provide[s] a (temporary) 
substitute for domestic capacity’.56 The successful polities are found in 
Northeast Asia, particularly Taiwan and Japan, insofar as they invoke a 
‘governed interdependence’ model (that is, pilot economic agencies 
embedded within the capitalist class).57 But this takes us to the heart of the 
 
53  Weiss, The myth of the powerless state, p. 4, emphasis added. Kenneth Waltz confirms this view of 
Weiss’s work in Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘Globalization and governance’, Political Science and Politics 
32(4) 1999, pp. 693–700, p. 696. Embedded autonomy has also been expressed as ‘bounded 
autonomy’ to describe ‘states with some independence from domestic social forces yet firmly 
oriented to participation in the international market economy’. See Ding Xin Zhao and John A. Hall, 
‘State power and patterns of late development: Resolving the crisis of the sociology of 
development’, Sociology 28(1) 1994, pp. 211–29, at p. 211. 
54  Rueschemeyer and Evans, ‘The state and economic transformation’, p. 60. 
55  Linda Weiss, ‘State power and the Asian crisis’, New Political Economy 4(3) 1999, pp. 317–42, at 
pp. 321–6; Rueschemeyer and Evans, ‘The state and economic transformation’, pp. 55–6. Compare 
G. John Ikenberry, ‘The irony of state strength: Comparative responses to the oil shocks in the 
1970s’, International Organization 40(1) 1986, pp. 105–37, at pp. 134–5; and Seabrooke, US power 
in international finance, chapter 7. 
56  Weiss, ‘State power and the Asian crisis’, pp. 328–9, 331. 
57  Weiss, ‘State power and the Asian crisis’, pp. 321–4; and Evans, ‘Transferable lessons?’, pp. 70–3. 
On the comparison of the administrative efficiency of Japan compared with the US see also Stephen 
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functionalist aspect of the approach. Put simply, state strength is found 
where it exists and states without it are criticised for its absence.58 Given 
these constraints, the embedded autonomy approach has severe problems 
in explaining change in the domestic realm (pre-determined evolution of 
agencies) and the international realm (characterised by timeless anarchy). 
Most important for the purposes of this piece is the fact that the embedded 
autonomy approach has great difficulty conceptualising legitimacy, 
although implicitly it relies on it. For example, Evans argues that: 
The principal problem with inequality (beyond its negative welfare 
implications) is that it has corrosive institutional effect. Concentrated 
wealth and income generate concentrated private power, which in turn 
increases the likelihood that public institutions will be captured by private 
elites. At the same time entrenched inequality undercuts the legitimacy of 
state autonomy.59 
Evans provides an argument that state autonomy requires a broad social 
legitimacy for its effective functioning, and that this legitimacy relies  
on the state maintaining institutional autonomy from the dominant eco-
nomic classes. And although Evans also asserts that the state must build 
‘social capital’ and trust that ‘spans the public-private divide’, legitimacy 
is ultimately rejected because society is viewed as fundamentally 
‘acquiescent’.60 From this top-down view, legitimacy is merely a resource 
 
D. Krasner, ‘The accomplishments of international political economy’, in Steve Smith, Ken Booth 
and Marysia Zalewski, eds, International theory: Positivism and beyond (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1996), p. 121. 
58  Tendencies bordering on tautological can be found in this literature, where although some states may 
not need ‘the elaborate underpinnings of state capacity in order to engage in regulatory control’ and 
others may, ‘the outcome appears to be shaped by the pre-existing constellation of ideas and 
institutions regarding the state-market relationship’. See Weiss, ‘State power and the Asian crisis’, 
pp. 324–5. Compare, on method, Geoffrey Ingham, ‘Some recent changes in the relationship 
between economics and sociology’, Cambridge Journal of Economics 20(2) 1996, pp. 243–75, at 
p. 251. 
59  Evans, ‘Transferable lessons?’, p. 82, emphasis added. 
60  Peter Evans, ‘Government action, social capital, and development: Reviewing the evidence of 
synergy’, in Peter Evans, ed., State–society synergy: Government and social capital in development 
(Berkeley: International and Area Studies, University of California, 1997), p. 201. Compare Lucas, 
‘The tension between despotic and infrastructural power: The military and the political class in 
Nigeria, 1985–1993’, Studies in Comparative International Development 33(3) 1998, pp. 90–113. 
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or instrument which states manipulate so as to successfully compete in the 
international system and thereby secure economic development.61 For 
example, Evans argues that in Third World states ‘one of the prime 
advantages of [the state] mobilizing ordinary citizens is that mobilization 
helps balance the inevitable ties with elites and thereby protects the 
integrity of the state as an institution’.62 Without studying legitimacy the 
embedded autonomy approach faces difficulty in overcoming ‘the ten-
dency to focus exclusively on the evolving relations between state and 
capital while neglecting or underrating the relations between state and 
civil society’.63 And as argued by Reinhard Bendix, one can focus on the 
‘functional equivalents’ that allow a state to modernise and compete in the 
international system, but the implementation of ‘functional equivalents’ 
presupposes that the state has legitimacy.64 In sum, the embedded 
autonomy approach to state capacity does not provide a substantive 
conception of the state–society complex. The next neo-Weberian approach 
to state autonomy and embeddedness seeks to overcome some of these 
problems outlined above by placing greater emphasis on social 
embeddedness.  
SOCIAL EMBEDDEDNESS 
The social embeddedness approach to state capacity emphasises that the 
state must not only be embedded in the dominant economic class, but also 
throughout broader society, in order to provide itself with a more flexible 
means of reconstituting itself.65 This brings us even closer to a substantive 
view of the state–society complex because the state’s relationship to 
society is viewed as a contested one rather than a functional one. This 
idea of contestation is critical for the social embeddedness approach, as it 
underpins the idea that while the state pushes and shapes the norms and 
 
61  Ted Robert Gurr, ‘War, revolution, and the growth of the coercive state’, in James A. Caporaso, ed., 
The elusive state (Newbury Park: Sage, 1989), p. 50. 
62  Evans, ‘Government action, social capital, and development’, p. 201. 
63  Trezzini, ‘Embedded state autonomy and legitimacy’, p. 336. 
64  Reinhard Bendix, Nation-building and citizenship: Studies of our changing social order, second 
edition (London: University of California Press, 1977), p. 416. 
65  Ikenberry, ‘The irony of state strength’, p. 136. 
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material conditions of society, the reverse is also true. Accordingly, 
involved in this contested relationship are issues of ‘trust’ and ‘quasi-
voluntary compliance’ between state and society, which cannot simply be 
reduced to measures of confidence or economic outcomes.66 In this 
conception the state is an arena in which contests take place between 
groups and in which the government seeks to attain a broad legitimation 
of its power from its people to implement its policies. Rather than isolated 
autonomy or embedded autonomy, the emphasis is on the socially 
regenerative aspects, which allow the state to engage with other states in 
the international arena.67 In contrast to the top-down view of the state in 
the first two neo-Weberian approaches presented here, the social embed-
dedness approach is more bottom-up. The difference comes down to 
different functional and contested views of the state and the associated 
view of whether society’s consent is necessary (as it is in the contested 
approach) or whether society is fundamentally acquiescent. Contestation 
and consent are integral to the social embeddedness approach and, for this 
reason, it is far less functionalist than either the isolated autonomy or 
embedded autonomy approaches. 
John M. Hobson’s work clearly aims to present a neo-Weberian 
approach on state capacity through the concept of social embeddedness.68 
Like some scholars in the embedded autonomy approach, his approach 
takes up many cues from Mann’s work on the ‘sources of social power’ to 
develop the ‘social sources of state power’.69 For Hobson’s analysis of 
state capacity, the embedded component of embedded autonomy refers 
not just to the state being embedded in the dominant classes but, above all, 
the lower classes. This can be found in his analysis of the interplay 
 
66  Margaret Levi, Of rule and revenue (London: University of California Press, 1988), pp. 52–4. 
Compare Ingham, ‘Some recent changes’, p. 250. 
67  Joel S. Migdal, Strong societies and weak states: State–society relations and state capabilities in the 
Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988); Thomas M. Callaghy, The state–society 
struggle: Zaire in comparative perspective (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984); Levi, Of 
rule and revenue; and Margaret Levi, Consent, dissent, and patriotism (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997). 
68  Hobson, The state and international relations, p. 204. 
69  Mann, The sources of social power, Vol. II, chapters 3 and 13. 
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between taxation and tariff protectionism before the Great War. Hobson 
argues that a state that has achieved social embeddedness is able (in the 
case of late-Victorian/Edwardian Britain) to ‘play off the dominant classes 
with the lower-middle and working classes’ in order to increase its 
extractive capacities (direct taxation) and hence state (fiscal) capacity.70 
Direct appeal to all classes is crucial in that it confers a higher degree of 
legitimacy for the state, thereby enabling it to enhance its tax extraction.71 
Upon reception of the British middle and working classes’ consent for the 
People’s Budget of 1909, with progressive income tax rates levied on the 
richer classes, the British state pursued legitimate increased tax extraction 
and enhanced state capacity.72 Increased state capacity was a consequence 
of the state’s social embeddedness, not its ability to embed itself in the 
dominant economic classes.73  
Conversely, following Weber, Tsarist Russia was too autonomous from 
society and the state’s lack of social embeddedness made income tax 
extraction impossible (income tax extraction requires consent from the 
dominant groupings). As a consequence Tsarist Russia relied on regressive 
indirect taxes (tariffs and excises), which proved to yield a far lower fiscal 
take than in Britain and punished the lower classes. These later took their 
revenge in 1917 when of course, they revolted against the Russian state.74 
The crucial point here is that scholars in the social embeddedness 
approach (as do those in the embedded autonomy approach) invert 
Skocpol’s thesis: namely that too much autonomy undermines the 
effectiveness of the state. But these scholars reject the functionalism of the 
embedded autonomy approach by arguing that the multiple sources of 
state capacity come from a state’s contested or ‘interactively embedded’ 
relationship with its society.75 The emphasis is therefore not only on the 
 
70  Hobson, The wealth of states, p. 236.  
71  Compare Carmenza Gallo, ‘The autonomy of weak states: States and classes in primary export 
economies’, Sociological Perspectives 40(4) 1997, in which Gallo produces a model of internal class 
conflict and class versus bureaucracy conflict over tax extraction. 
72  Hobson, The wealth of states, pp. 122, 138–41. 
73  Hobson, The wealth of states, pp. 142–4. Compare Geoffrey Ingham, Capitalism divided?: The city 
and industry in British social development (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1984).  
74  Hobson, The wealth of states, chapters 3 and 4. 
75  Hobson, The wealth of states, p. 240. Compare Seabrooke, US power in international finance. 
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development of linkages between government and the dominant economic 
class, but simultaneously a broad social embeddedness throughout society, 
which produces the legitimate social reproduction of the state.76 Thus 
broad social embeddedness permits a state to enact and adapt to change in 
the domestic and international realms. 
The focus upon the socially regenerative properties of the state–society 
complex also differentiates the social embeddedness approach’s view of 
the international realm from the approaches discussed above. As argued 
earlier, both the isolated autonomy and embedded autonomy approaches 
‘reheat neorealism’ by arguing that states must adapt to international 
dictates from the anarchical structure. The emphasis on external pressures 
permits the functionalist view of state–society relations and the view that 
society is fundamentally acquiescent. The social embeddedness approach 
departs from this view by arguing that while the international system does 
indeed ‘constrain’ states, it is also a ‘partial resource pool’ into which 
states dip to enhance their power and interests.77 The crucial point is that 
states are not merely passive victims of the dictates of international 
structural constraints (that is, anarchy), but they can actively shape the 
international order.78 Thus socially embedded states are more able to 
shape the international order on the basis of their domestic relations.79 
Moreover, sovereignty is downgraded in the social embeddedness 
approach because it treats states as ‘unlike units’, and refuses to abolish 
‘their domestic relations with society as conceptual variables in 
international politics’.80  
The ultimate problem from the social embeddedness approach is its 
failure to develop the concept of legitimacy. In Hobson’s analysis the state 
 
76  Hobson, The wealth of states, p. 237. 
77  Hobson, The state and international relations, pp. 210–13, emphasis in original. 
78  Hobson, The state and international relations, pp. 192–3, 210, 229–30. 
79  Hobson, The state and international relations, pp. 192–3, 230. 
80  John M. Hobson, ‘The historical sociology of the state and the state of historical sociology in 
international relations’, Review of International Political Economy 5(2) 1998, pp. 285–320, at 
p. 295; Hobson, The wealth of states, p. 252; and Hobson and Seabrooke, ‘Reimagining Weber’, 
pp. 265–6. Compare Ian Hurd, ‘Legitimacy and authority in international politics’, International 
Organization 53(2) 1999, pp. 379–405. 
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requires a broad social legitimation of its power to implement its policies 
and to secure its autonomy to enforce law against the interests of 
dominant political and economic groups. Such an analysis does not 
merely imply but relies directly on the legitimation of power. However, 
social embeddedness is an inadequate proxy for legitimacy. Rather than 
situating people’s decision to consent to state taxation policy in recog-
nition of changing social norms, Hobson explains support through 
strategic calculations. The British state resorted to income taxation to 
court the working class vote in the 1910 election, but kept the dominant 
classes on side by maintaining free trade (income taxation was the flipside 
of free trade because the alternative would have been protectionist tariffs 
to gain the revenues for the welfare reforms).81 Though the state is 
responding to the needs of the working classes as well as the dominant 
groupings, it is still done to enhance the state’s fiscal capacity on the one 
hand (income taxes were more lucrative than indirect taxes) and maintain 
the Liberal government in office. In short there are three major problems 
here: first, it is not a sufficiently bottom-up approach. Second, it retains 
some clear elements of functionalist analysis, which similarly tarnishes 
the first two approaches. And third, social norms very much play a 
backseat to strategic explanations of change.  
This general problem within neo-Weberian approaches is a conse-
quence of the denigrated position of legitimacy and the underdevelopment 
of the role of norms, despite Max Weber’s heavy emphasis on their 
importance (which I discuss below). In short, a bottom-up rather than 
simply top-down approach is impossible without a full conception of 
legitimacy which includes societal norms. And while consent rather than 
acquiescence is required from society for those in the social embed-
dedness approach, many treat legitimacy as the state’s propagation of a 
‘noble lie’ to attain ‘people’s approval of the state’s desired social order 
through their acceptance of the state’s myths’.82 Norms are viewed as 
 
81  Hobson, The wealth of states, p. 248. 
82  Muthiah Alagappa, ‘Introduction’, in Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), Political legitimacy in Southeast Asia: 
The quest for moral authority (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), p. 4; and Migdal, Strong 
societies and weak states, p. 33. Compare with Adrian Leftwich, ‘Bringing politics back in: Towards 
a model of the developmental state’, Journal of Development Studies 31(3) 1995, pp. 400–27, at 
pp. 419–20. 
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vague and ignored for a preference on strategic rationality for material 
gain.  
Margaret Levi’s work on ‘bringing people back into the state’ is 
particularly instructive on this point. Although Levi derives her view of 
the state from Weber, she ‘eschews the word legitimate, at least until the 
term acquires a consensual meaning’.83 Levi’s key concept in under-
standing why people consent to a state policy, ‘quasi-voluntary 
compliance’, retains the ‘strategic calculations and gains’ element of 
legitimacy and focuses upon the ‘perception of the bargain rather than 
ideas about what a good or fair contract is’.84 At the same time, however, 
she admits that ‘in most cases citizens are willing to go along with a 
policy they do not prefer as long as it is made according to a process they 
deem legitimate’.85 Levi’s analysis promotes the rationalist view that 
people understand their choices objectively, which severely limits her 
argument because evaluations of wants are not isolated from their social 
surroundings and, therefore, are better understood by more interpretive 
approaches. The next section thus seeks to bring a reinvigorated concept 
of legitimacy back in.  
BRINGING LEGITIMACY BACK IN: REALISING THE WEBERIAN 
LEGACY 
The substantive neo-Weberian approach to state capacity can only be 
advanced by ‘bringing legitimacy back in’ and removing the proxy of 
social embeddedness. As stated above legitimacy is commonly viewed as 
a poor indicator of changes within states and the study of organisational 
capacities is much preferred. This is primarily due to the idea that 
 
83  Levi, Of rule and revenue, p. 1, note 1, emphasis added. 
84  Levi, Of rule and revenue, p. 54, my emphasis. 
85  Levi, Consent, dissent, and patriotism, p. 23, emphasis added. Compare Levi, Of rule and revenue, 
pp. 5–7. Levi’s work also reflects the tension between a concentration on the use of historical 
specificities and the heuristic value and limitations of generalisation common to other neo-Weberian 
scholars. Undoubtedly, many scholars would place Levi in the second (embedded autonomy) 
approach to state capacity rather than the third (social embeddedness) due to her focus on cost-
effective means of extracting revenue (taxation) or, in her later work, military service. I disagree on 
the grounds that Levi’s work does, as she asserts, focus on organisational differences from power 
struggles within the state rather than maximising economic or military outcomes.  
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legitimacy represents a vague concept related to a relationship between ‘a 
monolithic bloc of rulers and an unidentified mass of subjects’.86 That is, 
it is ‘a matter of sentiment’ which provides ‘a reservoir of loyalty … 
giving [leaders] the discretionary authority they require to govern 
effectively’.87 The key protest against the use of legitimacy is that it is too 
hard to specify through objective criteria and, therefore, must be excluded 
from any serious social science research.88 However, while many neo-
Weberians have removed legitimacy from their analyses, others have 
attempted to define how legitimacy can be useful in understanding state–
society complexes.89  
David Beetham’s work on the legitimation of power provides a 
particularly fruitful way forward. Beetham begins his work by criticising 
the Weberian premise that power relations are legitimate when people 
believe them to be so. Such an approach he argues has been an ‘almost 
unqualified disaster’.90 Studies that understand legitimacy as only belief 
or public opinion effectively divorce people’s beliefs from their grounds 
and reasons for holding them in the first place.91 Rather, and as also 
argued by Bendix, the legitimation of power comes from ‘cumulative, 
individual acts of compliance or confidence’;92 actions expressed not 
‘because people believe in its legitimacy, but because it can be justified in 
terms of their beliefs’.93 In all state–society complexes other than the most 
abhorrent and despotic, the power-elite’s efficacy is constrained by the 
 
86  Rodney Barker, ‘Legitimacy: The identity of the accused’, Political Studies 42(1) 1994, pp. 101–2, 
at p. 102.  
87  John H. Schaar, Legitimacy in the modern state (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1989), p. 22; and 
Tom R. Tyler, Why people obey the law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), p. 26.  
88  Levi, Of rule and revenue, p. 17, an opinion also expressed in Beetham, The legitimation of power, 
p. 8. 
89  Barker, Legitimating identities, pp. 12–13. 
90  Beetham, The legitimation of power, p. 8. Compare Max Weber, Theory of social and economic 
organization, edited by Talcott Parsons (New York: Free Press, 1964), pp. 325–7, with Max Weber, 
Economy and society, Vols. 1 and 2 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 213–15. 
91  Beetham, The legitimation of power, pp. 8–10, 219; and Muthiah Alagappa, ‘The anatomy of 
legitimacy’, in Alagappa, ed., Political legitimacy in Southeast Asia, p. 12. 
92  Bendix, Nation-building and citizenship, p. 24, emphasis added. 
93  Beetham, The legitimation of power, pp. 11, 26, emphasis in original. 
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consented acts of those subordinate within the state.94 Following 
Beetham, a state’s legitimacy does not hold on belief alone, but rather 
when: 
• the state conforms to its own established rules; 
• state laws and policies can be justified by reference to norms shared 
by dominant and subordinate groups within the state; and 
• evidence of consent for state action is expressed by subordinates 
through action not only belief. 95 
These criteria recognise that legitimacy involves the contestation of 
power between state and society rather than a resource upon which the 
state can claim authority to implement its wishes (the latter being the 
leitmotif of the functionalist approaches discussed above).96 The crucial 
point is that if legitimacy involves actions expressive of consent, then both 
norms and material factors are brought into play and ‘ideas about what a 
good or fair contract is’ have specific policy relevance.97  
I would argue that the first two criteria are uncontroversial within the 
neo-Weberian approaches outlined above, and certainly are required in the 
social embeddedness approach. It is obvious that the limits of state action 
are set out in law and that the state should not arbitrarily break them.98 
These rules provide the basis for the state’s institutional autonomy, which 
 
94  An internalisation of a belief in authority is not sufficient to demonstrate that a power relationship 
has legitimacy and Beetham cites the story of The good soldier Schweik to accentuate this point. 
Throughout the story the soldier Schweik professes his belief in the Emperor’s legitimacy, yet his 
passive non-cooperation with all forms of state organisation reflects the state’s low degree of 
legitimacy. The result is, despite the sufficient organisational resources and clear rule of law, 
diminished Austro-Hungarian state capacity in the First World War. See Jaroslav Hasek, The good 
soldier Schweik (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1939). 
95  Beetham, The legitimation of power, pp. 15–16. 
96  Contrast Alagappa, ‘Introduction’, p. 2. 
97  Levi, Of rule and revenue, p. 54; and Barker, Legitimating identities, pp. 11, 19. 
98  Max Weber, Staatssoziologie (Berlin: Duncker und Humbolt, 1956), p. 31; Michael Walzer, 
Obligations: Essays on disobedience, war, and citizenship (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
Press, 1970), p. 18; Beetham, The legitimation of power, p. 16; and Mann, The sources of social 
power, Vol. II, p. 59. 
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is a running theme throughout neo-Weberian work, and which I also agree 
with, though on the proviso that rules can be justified by social norms. It 
stands to reason that the structure of power must be seen to recognise a 
general societal interest rather than simply that of the powerful, since such 
rule is often unsustainable. But in contrast to functionalist approaches, it is 
vital to emphasise that the justification of state policy according to social 
norms is more important than economic policy performance failure. Such 
failure does not necessarily suggest the illegitimacy of a political system 
since fair procedure not policy outcomes are the most important factor 
affecting the legitimacy of a power relationship.99 This is not to say that 
policy outcomes are unimportant, since chronic policy failures will lead to 
social discontent, but that economic outcomes alone do not provide a 
sustainable basis for the legitimation of power.100 
The third criterion, consent, is controversial and really does take us to 
the heart of the matter and provides the means to address Levi’s concern 
about eschewing legitimacy as a concept until it acquires a ‘consensual 
meaning’. Indeed, consent is the key issue in bringing legitimacy back in 
because it treats people as moral agents rather than acquiescent ruled 
subjects. Consent demonstrated by action indicates that people, even if out 
of self-interest, provide moral commitments to projects over time when 
they are in a general societal interest.101 And of course consent can be 
withdrawn through action. Rodney Barker’s study of the illegitimacy of 
the poll tax in Scotland, which involved ‘passive resistance by nearly a 
quarter of the population’ in withholding taxes, provides an excellent 
example.102 It also demonstrates the importance of social norms to the 
realisation of state capacity, despite efficient administrative organisation.  
 
 99  Beetham, The legitimation of power, pp. 17, 69; Bendix, Nation-building and citizenship, p. 20; and 
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A criticism of this line of argument could be that separating consent 
from acquiescence is simply too difficult. All states have dominant and 
subordinate groups, and within all states the rules of power encourage 
voluntary acceptance of one’s subordination.103 The difference is far from 
superficial. To argue that the relationship between state and society is 
more characterised by acquiescence than consent eventually leads us back 
on the track to functionalist and economic determinist explanations of 
state capacity (as in the neo-Weberian approaches presented earlier, or in 
neoclassical or Marxist-inspired theories). Moreover, consent focuses 
attention on contestation between state and society simply because 
consent can be given or withdrawn. Acquiescence, by contrast, implies a 
continuity that masks power relations. By stressing the need for consent 
by subordinates, the state immediately becomes more than either captured 
or enabled by the interests of the dominant political and economic 
classes.104 Demonstrating consent through actions provides a definitive 
break with a functionalist view of legitimacy. It also provides the break 
with approaches that focus on dysfunctions of capitalism and view 
legitimacy as a resource employed by the state and an ‘elite transnational 
class on its own terms and then forced or imposed on subaltern classes’ to 
instil a false consciousness.105 Instead, a focus on legitimacy requires a 
qualitative judgement to differentiate consent from acquiescence. And 
only through analysing consent, as if society does matter, can a bottom-up 
 
nearly a quarter of the population’. This resistance harmed the state’s extractive capacity and 
therefore its state capacity more generally. 
103  Beetham, The legitimation of power, p. 51. 
104  Hobson, The wealth of states, pp. 244–6; and Seabrooke, US power in international finance, p. 40. 
105  A criticism made by neo-Gramscians against other ‘Italian school’ Gramscians in Randall D. 
Germain and Michael Kenny, ‘Engaging Gramsci: International relations theory and the new 
Gramscians’, Review of International Studies 24(1) 1998, pp. 3–21, at pp. 18–19. As Germain and 
Kenny point out many aspects of Gramscian scholarship focuses on forms of material and 
ideological struggle from subaltern classes. Indeed, there are complementarities between the 
Gramscian historicism of Germain and others and neo-Weberian historicism. The sharp distinction 
often drawn between Weberian and Marxist approaches has been exaggerated, as Wolfgang 
Schluchter points out in his introduction to Bendix’s Force, fate and freedom, p. xiii. It should also 
be recognised that Weber’s academic attacks were as much against evolutionary determinism as they 
were against Marxism. Certainly Talcott Parsons exaggerated the virulence of Weber’s anti-
Marxism. See Peter Ghosh, ‘Some problems with Talcott Parsons’ version of the “protestant ethic”’, 
Archives Européennes De Sociologie XXXV(1) 1994, pp. 104–23, at p. 117. 
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analysis be produced. Once this is recognised it is impossible to fall-back 
into a top-down functionalist approach whereby ‘effective performance 
can be deployed to generate moral authority’ or where ‘[c]onsent is given 
to the formal source of commands, not to their content’.106 As stated, 
legitimacy rests on fair procedure related to policy content with regard to 
social norms, and not merely economic policy outcomes.  
By emphasising the consent expressed through action not belief the 
Weberian concept of legitimacy is given a conceptual ‘Heimlich 
manoeuvre’, providing an augmented social embeddedness neo-Weberian 
approach to state capacity through the introduction of social norms. In this 
way, it replaces the inadequate proxy of social embeddedness. Further-
more, it allows us to address the betrayal of the Weberian legacy found, 
particularly, in the isolated autonomy and embedded autonomy 
approaches, and reunites us with Weber’s key questions such as: ‘why do 
men obey?’; and what is the ‘meaning of human action’ and permits us to 
de-emphasise the state as merely the holder of the monopoly of legitimate 
violence.107 After all, Weber suggests that the ‘validity’ of a system of 
domination must be through a system of rational rules that can be justified 
by social norms, and it is this justification that ‘constitutes the basis of real 
differences in the empirical structure of domination’.108  
 
106  Alagappa, ‘The anatomy of legitimacy’, pp. 22, 24. 
107  R.I. Frank’s introduction in Max Weber, The agrarian sociology of ancient civilizations (London: 
Verso, 1998), p. 25; Max Weber, Political writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 
p. 354; and Christian Reus-Smit, ‘The idea of history and history with ideas’, in Stephen Hobden 
and John M. Hobson, eds, Historical sociology of international relations (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), pp. 123–9. On the monopoly of violence, even the most preliminary of 
investigations into the monopolies of violence a state must hold reveals that Weber is referring to 
social policy such as policing and corporal punishment. See Weber, Economy and society, pp. 54–6; 
and Weber, Staatssoziologie, p. 31. 
108  Weber, Economy and society, pp. 953–4. Compare Reus-Smit, The moral purpose of the state, pp. 
93–4. See also Richard Swedberg, Max Weber and the idea of economic sociology (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 167–71. For Swedberg the implications of Weber’s view of 
rationality leads to an economic ethic centred on questions of ‘well-being’ which require value 
judgements from the scholar. Swedberg argues that Weber’s view of rationality is distinct from the 
contemporary association of rationality with calculated self-interest in that rationality is affected by 
social norms and is therefore varied across societies and historically contingent. 
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In Weber’s view it is the ‘complex of human relations, norms and 
norm-determined relations which we call “state”’.109 The state itself has 
‘no intrinsic value’, it is ‘purely a technical instrument for the realization 
of other values … only as long as it does not seek to transcend this merely 
auxiliary status’. 110 The key characteristic of the modern state compared 
with absolutism or despotism is that its power rests on a broad social 
legitimacy which includes the ‘disposal of an earlier separate justice 
(Eigenrecht) that was dispossessed and seated in the highest point of 
place’ and requires the state to reflect social norms.111  
Ironically Weber’s most famous work, The protestant ethic and the 
spirit of capitalism, exemplifies the importance he places on both norms 
and material factors in the development of the legitimation of different 
systems of political and economic relations.112 Indeed, Weber was critical 
of the idea that legitimacy could be studied as belief isolated from 
material conditions.113 Despite the common image of Weber as the 
‘Godfather’ of statist-realism in international relations theory,114 it is the 
legitimation of power in the domestic realm, and its relationship with the 
legitimating actions by Great Powers in the international realm that 
interests Weber.115 It is precisely this that forms the core of the augmented 
 
109  Max Weber, Gesammelte politische schriften (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1988), p. 162. 
110  Weber, ‘The meaning of ethical neutrality’, p. 47; and Weber, Political writings, p. 354. Compare 
David Beetham, ‘In defence of legitimacy’, Political Studies 41(3) 1993, pp. 488–91, at p. 490. 
111  Weber, Staatssoziologie, p. 31, my translation. 
112  Max Weber, The protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism (London: George Allen and Unwin, 
1976); Randall Collins, ‘Weber’s last theory of capitalism’, in Mark Granovetter and Richard 
Swedberg, eds, The sociology of economic life (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), p. 99; and Bendix, 
Nation-building and citizenship, p. 33. 
113  Weber, Economy and society, pp. 32–3. 
114  This view conflicts with Hans-Karl Pichler, ‘The godfathers of “truth”: Max Weber and Carl Schmitt 
in Morgenthau’s theory of power politics’, Review of International Studies 24(2) 1998, pp. 185–200. 
Weber’s ‘non-realist’ view of the state is ‘fleshed out’ in Hobson and Seabrooke, ‘Reimagining 
Weber’; and Seabrooke, US power in international finance, pp. 44, 208.  
115  This is what Weber meant when discussing Germany’s role to protect the Swiss, the Danes, the Poles 
and others from the ‘Russian knout’ (despotism) and ‘boring British conventionalism’ (cultural 
homogenisation). See Weber, Gesammelte politische schriften, pp. 143, 175–7. 
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social embeddedness approach that I seek to develop here into a neo-
Weberian historicist approach.  
By emphasising the importance of consent and justification in under-
standing legitimacy, some criticisms directed at neo-Weberian scholarship 
from other schools of thought can be addressed. For starters, the view that 
neo-Weberians always substitute the ‘elite for mass politics, [and] political 
conflict for social struggle’, can be rejected.116 But more important are 
attacks from Marxist-inspired scholars, who argue that, ‘some of the [neo-
Weberian] literature runs the risk of tautology to the extent that strength is 
defined purely in terms of outcomes’;117 or, more aggressively, that neo-
Weberians endorse regimes for reasons of economic growth without 
assessing the harm created by authoritarian regimes.118 Clearly these 
appropriate criticisms are aimed at neo-Weberian scholarship which has 
taken the functionalist route. As stated, the first criticism is correct and 
can only be corrected by a non-functionalist approach. By bringing 
legitimacy back in to a neo-Weberian approach, which analyses and 
differentiates state–society complexes by the ‘solidarities they achieve’ 
rather than the efficiencies they realise, the second criticism can be 
addressed.119 An approach to state capacity which focuses on the 
regenerative properties of a state–society complex would not advocate the 
politics of growth over the politics of distribution, and would view states 
with weak legitimacy but high economic growth as having fragile state 
capacity.120  
A retort here could be that any focus on state capacity is necessarily 
functionalist, since it always assesses a functional contribution to a state’s 
 
116  Linda Gordon, ‘The welfare-state: Towards a socialist-feminist perspective’, Socialist Register 1990, 
pp. 171–200, at p. 181. 
117  Bob Jessop, ‘Bringing the state back in (yet again): Reviews, revisions, rejections, and redirections’, 
International Review of Sociology 11(2) 2001, pp. 149–73, at p. 164. Compare Peter Burnham, 
‘Open Marxism and vulgar international political economy’, Review of International Political 
Economy 1(2) 1994, pp. 221–31, at p. 222. 
118  See Leonard Binder, ‘The natural history of development theory’, Comparative Studies in Society 
and History 28(1) 1988, pp. 3–33; and Leftwich, ‘Bringing politics back in’. 
119  Bendix, Nation-building and citizenship, p. 399. 
120  Compare Weiss, The myth of the powerless state, p. 203. 
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ability to enact and adapt to change in the domestic and international 
realms. But in the view provided here, legitimacy is not treated as a 
resource solely to be manipulated for pure reasons of state. A state’s 
capacity relates to its degree of legitimacy (assessed by the scholar’s 
judgement), which is a consequence of the constellation of social power. 
Highly legitimate policies produce socially beneficial outcomes, and 
measuring these outcomes is necessary in understanding the context in 
which further reforms take place as both norms and material factors are 
important. The emphasis, however, is not on competitive adaptation to an 
anarchical international system where success is measured only 
economically or militarily, both inadequate measures of a state’s capacity 
to reproduce itself. Rather, this approach treats people within states as 
complex moral agents who can give and withdraw their consent rather 
than treating them as acquiescent.121  
THE LEGITIMACY OF FINANCIAL REFORM IN THE US AND JAPAN 
I apply the approach outlined above to the following case study, to 
demonstrate that the US has been able to enhance its state capacity by 
selectively exporting domestic social norms regarding finance to the 
international financial order. This is, to a great degree, due to the domestic 
legitimacy of financial reforms in the US. In the US domestic financial 
reforms have been highly contested and, as a consequence, have been 
justified according to American social norms and received the consent of 
subordinate groups. In contrast, Japan has been less able to inter-
nationalise its domestic social norms regarding finance and its financial 
reforms have gone relatively uncontested, resulting in weak legitimacy 
and a withdrawal of consent from the Japanese public. Here I analyse 
financial reforms in both states during the 1985–2000 period. 
As I have argued elsewhere, understanding US ‘structural power’ in 
international finance requires more than an assessment of regulatory 
structure and capital flows.122 Once credit is viewed as a ‘promise to pay’ 
 
121  Reus-Smit, ‘The idea of history and history with ideas’, p. 124. 
122  Susan Strange, States and markets (London: Pinter, 1988), p. 18; and Seabrooke, US power in 
international finance.  
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against a state–society complex rather than simply deferred payment of 
capital, financial power rests on legitimacy—that ‘promises to pay’ will 
be honoured.123 The US’s construction of its capacity to honour its 
promises to pay has provided it with enormous international financial 
power.  
The US’s ‘structural power’, which greatly influences the formal 
legitimacy of international financial practice, is assisted by the selective 
exportation of American social norms regarding finance to the inter-
national financial order. However, such internationalisation does not mean 
the internationalisation of American domestic financial regulatory 
structures. Rather, the high degree of domestic legitimacy regarding finan-
cial reform sustains a system of ‘national regulatory activism’ coupled 
with ‘international regulatory passivity’.124 Thus while domestic regu-
lation is provided to legitimate the financial system and its capacity to 
serve a broad societal interest according to norms of fairness and social 
mobility, American norms related to entrepreneurship and individual 
choice over investment with minimal intergovernmental interference are 
selectively exported internationally. American social norms thus include a 
mix of actual financial practices and commonly-held assumptions about 
appropriate financial behaviour. One need only glance at the history of the 
US’s involvement with the Euromarkets during the 1960s to trace a 
pattern of ‘national activism with international passivity’.125 
Despite frequent criticisms concerning its ‘international passivity’, the 
US government’s ‘national activism’ on financial reform has a high 
degree of domestic legitimacy, primarily due to government and public 
initiatives to guide financial reform to meet social wants. Certainly 
reforms to increase homeownership and guards against banks ‘redlining’ 
credit provision to poor communities provide good examples of reforms 
which have received consent from subordinate groups and have been 
 
123  Geoffrey Ingham, ‘On the underdevelopment of the “sociology of money”’, Acta Sociologica 41(1) 
1998, pp. 3–18; Weber, Economy and society, p. 108; and Seabrooke, US power in international 
finance, pp. 23–31. 
124  Seabrooke, US power in international finance, chapter 1. 
125  I provide a potted history of America’s ‘national regulatory activism and international passivity’ 
during the 1960s in Seabrooke, US power in international finance, chapter 3. 
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justified according to American social norms concerning fairness and 
social mobility. This does not suggest that American financial reforms are 
uncontested, but rather the opposite. Public contestation of a policy is a 
crucial component in gaining the active consent for a policy from 
subordinate groups. Because American finance is actively contested by 
lobby groups and community organisations, financial reforms are more 
likely to be in a broad societal interest and receive the consent, expressed 
through changed financial practices, of lower and middle classes. Thus, in 
contrast to suggestions that American financial reform represents 
‘gridlock’ or that protracted financial reforms have furthered American 
decline, highly contested financial reform leads to greater legitimacy and 
enhanced state capacity.126 
American financial reform differs greatly from Japan’s financial 
restructuring, which has reflected a lack of consent and legitimacy. Japan 
provides an interesting case because it is often assumed that there is a 
social consensus on Japanese finance, typically asserted by the ongoing 
popularity of the postal savings system which has been vital to Japanese 
economic development.127 Furthermore, within the Japanese context it is 
assumed that a social consensus on policy produces superior policy 
outcomes than when policy direction is publicly contested.128 I have found 
that contests over financial reform are not about maximising efficiencies 
and international competitiveness, but changing material power relation-
ships and challenges to established social norms concerning financial 
activity. Changes to domestic financial systems must be made in a broad 
societal interest and gain the consent of subordinate groups to be sustained 
and if they are to be internationalised. The consent of subordinate groups 
is also important because it is often these groups that provide a basis upon 
 
126  As opposed to the view put forward in Philip G. Cerny, ‘Gridlock and decline: Financial 
internationalization, banking politics, and the American political process’, in Stubbs and Underhill, 
eds, Political economy and the changing global order, p. 426.  
127  For example, Costas Lapavitsas, ‘Transition and crisis in the Japanese financial system: An 
overview’, Working Paper 58 (London: Department of Economics, School of Oriental and African 
Studies, University of London, 1996), p. 5. 
128  As argued in Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural norms and national security: Police and military in 
postwar Japan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996).  
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which financial institutions can expand their access to credit domestically 
and internationally.129 In short, contests over the legitimacy of domestic 
financial reform have implications for legitimating and structuring 
preferences in the international financial order.  
To isolate an important factor in the legitimation of our current 
international financial order we need only look at the American response 
to the debt crisis of the early 1980s.130 American public opposition to the 
idea of ‘bailing out’ American commercial banks led to the development 
of the International Lending Supervisory Act (ILSA) which imposed 
restrictions on the rating of American banks’ international loan operations. 
Banks considered to have low capital adequacy levels (reserves should 
default occur) were punished through the placement of premiums on their 
interbank lending activities.131 As a consequence banks rushed out of 
lending to developing states to increase their capital adequacy and moved 
to providing credit through securities markets.132 The consequent pressure 
on US banks to increase capital adequacy levels led to intense lobbying 
from the American Bankers’ Association for the US government to 
develop, with Britain, the Basle Accord. The Basle Accord of 1988 greatly 
hobbled the competitiveness of Japanese banks and led to their massive 
purchasing of US government debt (to shore up their capital adequacy) to 
continue to be legitimate agents in the international financial order.133 
Furthermore, to meet the requirements of the Basle Accord, Japanese 
 
129  Below I discuss the increase in homeownership in the US which has been aided and, in turn, assists 
the development of mortgage securitisation. Also the use of household credit instruments has 
expanded rapidly in the last decade, nearly three times the rate of gross fixed capital formation in the 
mid-1990s. See OECD, OECD economic surveys, 1995–1996, United States (Japan and Paris: 
OECD, 1996), p. 23. 
130  Seabrooke, US power in international finance, pp. 119–24. 
131  Thomas D. Simpson, ‘Developments in the US financial system since the mid-1970s’, Federal 
Reserve Bulletin January 1998, pp. 1–13, at p. 8. 
132  Eric Helleiner, States and the reemergence of global finance: From Bretton Woods to the 1990s 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), p. 183. 
133  Seabrooke, US power in international finance, pp. 135–40, 174–6, 178, 188; and David Woo, ‘In 
search of the “capital crunch”: Supply factors behind the credit slowdown in Japan’, International 
Monetary Fund Working Paper 99/3 (Washington, DC: Monetary and Exchange Affairs Department, 
IMF, 1999), p. 4. 
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banks purchased over US$50 billion in US government debt, creating a 
windfall for US government spending.134  
The importance of the ILSA, and its international effects, is highlighted 
by the high degree of domestic legitimacy. As J. Lawrence Broz has 
pointed out in his recent examination of congressional voting behaviour 
and international financial crises, support for not ‘bailing out’ American 
financial institutions of their international obligations comes over-
whelmingly from the political representation of lower and middle class 
electorates.135 Compounded by the savings and loans crisis of the mid-
1980s, ‘ordinary’ Americans consented to financial reforms which would 
place greater restrictions on American banks and encourage American 
financial institutions to fulfil domestic social wants.136 One can point to 
the tightening up of the American financial system to prevent bank 
failures, but the clearest demonstration of highly legitimate reforms can be 
found in financial reforms that enable Americans to purchase their own 
homes.137 Indeed, policies towards ‘mortgage securitisation’ and credit 
provision to lower class areas provide examples of financial reforms 
tailored to fulfilling specific American social norms. 
In 1984 the passing of the Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement 
Act brought in a secondary market for mortgage-backed securities and 
assisted the securitisation of one-third of all mortgages in the US between 
1984 and 1988.138 Furthermore, assisted by three Congressional-chartered 
competing quasi-government mortgage agencies, Fannie Mae (Federal 
National Mortgage Association), Freddie Mac (Federal National Mortgage 
Loan Corporation), and Ginnie Mae (Government National Mortgage 
 
134  Andrew C. Sobel, Domestic choices, international markets: Dismantling national barriers and 
liberalizing securities markets (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1994), p. 115. 
135  J. Lawrence Broz, ‘The political economy of international bailouts: Congressional voting on bailout 
legislation in the 1990s’, paper presented at the 2001 Annual Meeting of the American Political 
Science Association, San Francisco, 30 August–2 September 2001. 
136  Seabrooke, US power in international finance, pp. 134–6, 143, 168, 189. 
137  George G. Kaufman, ‘Preventing banking crises in the future: Lessons from past mistakes’, 
Independent Review (2)1 1997, pp. 55–77, at pp. 70–1. 
138  Thomas H. Hammond and Jack H. Knott, ‘The deregulatory snowball: Explaining deregulation in 
financial industry’, Journal of Politics 50(1) 1988, pp. 3–30, at p. 21. 
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Association), loans to low income groups increased dramatically. In 1990, 
eighteen per cent of the mortgage market went to low-income borrowers 
and with financial reforms to encourage increased access to mortgages 
this income group represented 29 per cent of the market by 1998.139 
Capital from these financial reforms has been enormous and constitutes a 
source of international financial power. For example, capital investment 
flowing into ‘Wall Street’ from mortgage-backed securitisation has 
consistently been bigger than the US defence budget in recent years (in 
1998 it was US$259.7 billion or 3.2 per cent of GDP).140 
Also involved in this process is the Federal Home Loan Banks 
(FHLBanks), which have greater assets and liabilities than Citicorp and 
issues more overnight debt than the US treasury. The FHLBanks are 
important because their social and political importance extended beyond 
any short-term economic rationale.141 Following financial reforms in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, the FHLBanks provided an Affordable 
Housing Program and Community Investment Program to assist low to 
middle income earners with credit for housing and business. These 
community-driven financial reforms emerged during a period of ongoing 
commercial bank centralisation and subsequent concerns over mortgages 
being borrowed from non-local financial institutions.142  
Such concerns were also reflected in the defence of the Community 
Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA) when faced with opposition from 
Republican and bank lobby groups during debates over the provisions of 
the Financial Services Modernization Act of 2000, that permitted the 
centralisation of financial and regulatory actors. The CRA, which 
monitors banks’ lending to lower income communities in the hope of 
 
139  National Community Reinvestment Coalition, ‘NCRC reiterates support for presidential veto of 
banking bill’, US Newswire 4 November 1999. 
140  OECD, OECD economic surveys, 1998–1999, United States (Paris: OECD, 1999), p. 52. 
141  Susan Hoffmann and Mark Cassell, ‘What are the federal home loan banks up to? Emerging views 
of purpose among institutional leadership’, paper presented at the 2000 Annual Meeting of the 
American Political Science Association, Marriot Wardman Park, 30 August–3 September 2000, 
pp. 3–5.  
142  Robert B. Avery, Raphael W. Bostic, Paul S. Calem and Glenn B. Canner, ‘Trends in home 
purchasing lending: Consolidation and the Community Reinvestment Act’, Federal Reserve Bulletin 
February 1999, pp. 75–84, at pp. 81, 84. 
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preventing ‘redlining’ (where communities are not provided with credit) 
and ‘sub-prime’ lending to low income groups, was actively defended by 
government sponsored community organisations like the National Com-
munity Reinvestment Coalition (NCRC). The NCRC’s successful defence 
was based on the CRA’s social legitimacy, arguing that weakening the act 
would be ‘like rolling back the GI Bill or Social Security because too 
many veterans had received higher education or too many senior citizens 
had escaped poverty’.143  
In sum, the US system of ‘national activism’ is highly legitimate 
according to American social norms with regard to fairness, social 
mobility, and entrepreneurship. Such power relies on the domestic legiti-
macy of highly contested financial reforms such as supporting mortgage 
provision to lower and middle income groups. And as reflected in the 
ILSA it is these same groups which support a ‘no bail out’ policy on 
American banks’ international activities and, through it, international 
passivity. Contests over financial reform in the US have resulted in highly 
legitimate domestic policy changes which reflect norms of fairness, social 
mobility, and entrepreneurship. However, fairness is not extended to the 
international financial order. The domestic legitimacy of American 
finance creates a greater capacity for the US to selectively export 
American social norms regarding finance, particularly the entrepreneurial, 
investor-freedom aspects including ideas of limited intergovernmental 
intervention. This system contributes greatly to the US’s structural power 
in international finance and the maintenance of domestic standards of 
living and access to credit. It also creates an international financial order 
that may only have a formal international legitimacy, but which alters 
other states’ capacities. For example, during 1997–98 more than 30 
Japanese banks withdrew from international operations to avoid the Basle 
Accords’ eight per cent capital adequacy requirement in favour of the 
Japanese government’s four per cent.144  
 
143  John Taylor from the National Community Reinvestment Coalition, cited in ‘NCRC reiterates 
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144  Woo, ‘In search of the “capital crunch”’, p. 4. 
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Indeed, Japan provides a clear case of a state that has worked within an 
international financial order that reflects selective American domestic 
norms and which compounds the weak domestic legitimacy of Japanese 
financial reform. The trouble Japan has encountered in implementing 
domestic financial reform can be traced to an institutional incapacity to 
push through reforms demanded internationally and domestically. In 
contrast to the perception of Japan as a strong state because of its ability to 
coordinate and efficiently implement top-down reforms, ‘capacity of the 
[Japanese] state to direct and control, not just to intervene and participate 
… [is] a function of its ability to persuade, bargain, or cajole in order to 
induce consent’.145  
Again we can go back to governmental responses to the debt crisis to 
understand Japan’s position in the contemporary international financial 
order. In contrast to the development of the ILSA in the US, the ‘Japanese 
government had purchased for Japanese banks a clear path for retreat’ by 
arranging for Japanese factoring companies to purchase bad loans and 
then wipe off losses as tax deductions.146 Public opposition to the ‘bail 
out’ of Japanese banks’ bad investments to developing states went unheard 
and the Japanese Ministry of Finance (MoF) continued a centrally 
coordinated ‘convoy’ approach to financial reform, in which the pace of 
reform was tied to the slowest financial institution. This close relationship 
with financial institutions was reflected in the development of the jusen 
real estate investment, which in many ways draws close parallels with the 
savings and loans scandal in the US but with less legitimate domestic 
policy outcomes. 
In the mid-to-late 1980s the MoF encouraged Japanese banks to invest 
in real estate with the assistance of capital from Norinchukin, the central 
 
145  John O. Haley, ‘Consensual governance: A study of law, culture, and the political economy of 
postwar Japan’, in Shumpei Kumon and Henry Rosovsky, eds, The political economy of Japan: 
Volume 3, Cultural and social dynamics (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), p. 33. On Japan 
as a strong state compared to the US because of supposed administrative efficiency see Krasner, 
‘The accomplishments of international political economy’, p. 121. 
146  Frances Rosenbluth, ‘Japanese banks in Mexico: The role of government in private decisions’, 
International Journal 46, 1991, pp. 668–86, at p. 684; and Louis W. Pauly, ‘Institutionalizing a 
stalemate: National financial policies and the international debt crisis’, Journal of Public Policy 
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agricultural credit cooperative, who formed jusen or housing companies 
as key mortgage providers.147 Banks were required to use jusen to 
purchase real estate and by 1991 the jusen had captured twelve per cent of 
the market for housing loans, up from 3.7 per cent in 1976.148 The 
investments were grossly overvalued and with the bursting of the 
Japanese financial bubble in 1990–91 the jusen problem became serious. 
Between 1990 and 1995 real estate and stock price losses amounted to 
over US$6 trillion or approximately, at the time, two years national 
output.149 This is not to suggest that the economic crash was a cause of a 
loss of legitimacy. Rather, it is the failure to justify financial reforms 
according to Japanese social norms concerning the responsible, 
responsive, role of government that led to a loss of legitimacy.  
Immediate financial reforms did follow the bursting of the Japanese 
financial bubble with the Financial System Reform Act of 1992 and the 
coordination of 162 banks to create a Cooperative Credit Purchasing 
Company to buy up Japanese banks’ mass of non-performing loans.150 
However, the management of Japan’s financial woes did not conform to 
social norms and the MoF’s prospect of a taxpayer sponsored bail out of 
jusen ‘brought long-simmering public unease over the ministry’s vast 
powers to a rolling boil’.151 Certainly the 1993 defeat of the Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP), which lost power for the first time since 1955, 
was assisted by a withdrawal of public consent over financial reform and 
support for the conservative yet ‘idealistic reformers’ of the Japan New 
Party who were ‘genuinely disturbed by the deep-seated corruption’ and 
sought ‘a more responsible party politics, a more deregulated economy, 
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and a more internationalized Japan’.152 And although the LDP didn’t stay 
out of office for long, within the Japanese social context the political 
change represented a significant withdrawal of public consent that was 
compounded by the process of financial reform. The withdrawal of 
consent for the Japanese system was also a consequence of the close links 
between the jusen, Norinchukin, the MoF and the LDP, in which ‘many if 
not most agricultural cooperatives were headed by local political bosses, 
with direct patron-client ties to LDP Diet Members’. A public withdrawal 
of consent over the jusen issue continued. For example, in a poll taken by 
the newspaper Asahi Shimbun, 90 per cent of the respondents objected to 
the idea that Japanese taxpayers’ monies should be used to soak up bad 
loans from jusen.153  
Public withdrawal of consent for financial policy direction was also 
due to the lack of opportunities to contest its procedure and aims. One 
measure to prevent the public from openly contesting financial policy was 
the concept of gaiatsu (foreign pressure), in which the government was 
‘unavoidably’ compelled to respond to external pressures over which it 
had no input. But in the mid-1990s international scandals demonstrated 
that external pressure was not concomitant with internal unfair practices. 
For example, the case of Daiwa’s non-delivery of US$1.1 billion to 
American banks from currency speculation raised Japanese public scorn 
when it was revealed that the MoF had two months prior knowledge of 
Daiwa’s currency trading problems and did not inform US Federal 
Reserve regulators.154 The incident, along with the 1997 collapse of 
Japanese financial giant the Hokkaido Takushoku Bank (also known as 
Takugin) affirmed that MoF support was ‘no longer a sufficient guarantee 
of success’.155 Takugin’s fall also led to the forced resignations of both 
Administrative Vice Finance Minister Takeshi Komura and the chief of 
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the MoF Secretariat, Toshiro Muto.156 Problems over fair procedure in 
financial practice intensified public calls for financial reform and led to 
the establishment, in October 1998, of a Financial Revitalization 
Commission (FRC). This commission went on to remove MoF powers to 
allocate funds to banks with problems and to create a new post, a Minister 
for Financial Reconstruction.157 It also created a new ‘super-regulator’, 
the FSA (Financial Supervisory Agency, renamed the Financial Services 
Agency from July 2000), which was staffed by ex-MoF bureaucrats in an 
attempt to create an agency to oversee the overseers.158 
With some success the FSA has been able to put in place financial 
reforms within Japan but ongoing public concerns concerning its 
‘arbitrarily changing standards without public discussion or oversight’ 
raised concerns about the lack of consent sought from the Japanese public 
for financial reform.159 This could also be seen in the MoF’s response to 
calls for eased restrictions on foreign investment for declaration in the late 
1990s, whereby they declared that financial reforms would be a staggered 
process because ‘the concept of investor self-responsibility is not yet 
established’.160 Following a partial removal of foreign exchange controls 
on 1 April 1998, investment out of Japan amounted to a record ¥7.8 
trillion or US$56 billion.161 In contrast to the stress often placed on the 
postal savings system, this push was public driven and reflects a change in 
Japanese social norms which has not been reflected in Japanese financial 
reform due to the lack of contested policy.162 On this point I can only 
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agree with Jennifer Amyx’s assertion that the key factor in Japan’s case is 
whether ‘a state is empowered by its embeddedness with other actors [but 
also whether it] … is constrained by its embeddedness’.163 The case of 
Japanese financial reform demonstrates that despite embeddedness 
between the government and the dominant economic actors (particularly 
financial institutions), weak domestic legitimacy reduces state capacity. 
CONCLUSION 
My analysis suspects that a focus on the legitimacy of state–society 
relations can explain the form of a state’s international financial policy. 
The first two neo-Weberian approaches (isolated state autonomy and 
embedded autonomy) would argue that the US can structure international 
finance because it is the foremost economic and military power in the 
world. But this is an insufficient explanation, not least because it returns 
us to functionalist explanations and provides a poor understanding of 
historical change.  
The specific form of the US’s international financial power is an 
expression of domestic social norms and subsequent legitimacy of 
financial policy, factors which the neo-Weberian approaches critiqued 
above omit. Indeed, in all areas of great social significance, such as 
security, trade and finance, it is difficult to conceive of a situation in 
which the public’s consent is considered unimportant or irrelevant and 
therefore an analysis which eschews legitimacy involves an inadequate 
view of the state–society complex.  
The historicist ‘pay off’ with regard to the US and Japanese case 
studies is that we isolate a change with norms and material interests 
during a period without letting contemporary perceptions of what a 
‘natural’ American or Japanese financial system might look like. One 
might be surprised at the extent of ‘national activism’ in the US system 
although, during the period studied, the state clearly relies on financial 
regulation domestically to legitimate American finance according to social 
norms of fairness, social mobility and entrepreneurship, while selectively 
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exporting norms about the individual (investor) choice and minimal state 
intervention to the international financial order. In the Japanese case 
assumptions about a ‘natural’ predilection for postal savings and tolerance 
over allowing government to fairly manage the financial system must both 
be addressed. Japanese social norms with regard to domestic finance 
during the 1985–2000 period were under transition. The difficulty for the 
Japanese state was legitimating its actions while operating within the 
constraints of the US-dominated international financial order.  
Understanding the specific social forms of a state’s power and 
capacities can only be understood through an historicist approach. By 
‘bringing legitimacy back in’ to a neo-Weberian historicist approach we 
are able to specify what we are looking for when we wish to assess the 
state–society complex and state capacity. The approach provided here 
seeks to live up to the Weberian legacy of studying the role of norms and 
material factors that make up constellations of power. It reintroduces 
legitimacy because the concept opens a number of doors with which we 
can understand the state not only as a competitor in an anarchical 
international system, but also as a moral community. Once legitimacy has 
been brought back in, assessments of state capacity become judgements 
about the regenerative properties of a state. The focus rightly shifts from 
the maximising economic or military performance to the meaning of 
human action.  
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